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1004 Michigan Law Review 
BANKRUPTCY PREFERENCES-SECURED TRANS-
ACTIONS-Security Interest in After-Acquired 
Property Is Voidable Preference if Received 
Within Four Months of Bankruptcy-In re 
Portland Newspaper Publishing Co.* 
[Vol. 65 
In an effort to provide employment for several hundred workers 
who had lost their jobs in an unsuccessful strike against Portland's 
two largest newspapers, the local printers' unions and several civic 
leaders organized the Portland Reporter Publishing Co. (Reporter) 
to publish a rival newspaper. The unions also formed the Rose 
City Development Co. (Rose City), which leased facilities and equip-
ment to Reporter and subsequently made several emergency oper-
ating loans to it. These loans were secured by an agreement designat-
ing as collateral all of Reporter's previously unsecured accounts 
receivable, both present and after-accruing. This type of agreement 
-securing after-acquired property of the debtor-is provided for 
in section 9-204(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code).1 
Shortly after the execution of the agreement, Rose City filed the 
financing statement required by section 9-302 of the Code for the 
perfecting of the security interest.2 Two years later, when Re-
porter (which in the interim had merged with the Portland News-
paper Publishing Co.) was adjudicated bankrupt, Rose City at-
tempted to establish its priority, as a secured creditor, to all of the 
accounts receivable of the insolvent newspaper which were covered 
by the security agreement. The trustee in bankruptcy objected, 
maintaining that the accounts receivable accruing within four 
months before bankruptcy were voidable preferences under section 
60a of the Bankruptcy Act,3 so that only those receivables accruing 
prior to the four month period were subject to Rose City's security 
interest.4 Held, a trustee in bankruptcy may void security interests 
in after-acquired accounts receivable accruing within four months 
of bankruptcy because such interests constitute transfers for an ante-
• 2 BANKR. L. REP. (4th ed.) 1 61722 (D. Ore. 1966) [hereinafter referred to as 
principal case]. 
1. ORE. REY. STAT. § 79.2040(3) (1965). The Code's general definition of an account 
is found in § 9-106, ORE. REv. STAT. § 79.1060 (1965). All references to the Code are 
to the 1962 Official Text. "After-acquired" clauses in security agreements have been 
used in varying forms and with various degrees of success for many years. For the 
pre-Code history of this security device, see Cohen & Gerber, The After-Acquired 
Property Clause, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1939). 
2. U.C.C. § 9-302, ORE. REv. STAT. § 79.3020 (1965), requires the filing of such 
statements unless only an insignificant percentage of the accounts is covered by the 
security agreement. 
3. 30 Stat. 544 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964). 
4. The great majority of receivables which accrued before the four-month period 
were no longer outstanding at the time of suit. Thus, the more recent accounts repre-
sented about 95% of Portland's receivables. 
March 1967] Recent Developments 1005 
cedent debt and thus are preferences within the meaning of section 
60 of the Bankruptcy Act.5 
The Uniform Commercial Code has attempted to facilitate cur-
rent asset financing by sanctioning the use of "floating liens"-
security agreements which cover both present and after-acquired 
collateral without further negotiation between the parties. Par-
ticularly relevant are three interrelated sections of article 9: section 
9-204(3) allows the use of after-acquired property as collateral;6 
section 9-110 deems sufficient a description of collateral that rea-
sonably identifies it;7 and section 9-205 enables the debtor to retain 
possession and full control of property which is subject to a security 
agreement. 8 The question in the principal case was whether the 
Code's approach, outlined briefly above, conflicted with section 60 
of the Bankruptcy Act, which attempts to prevent a debtor facing 
imminent bankruptcy from "transferring" his property to selected 
general creditors "for or on account of an antecedent debt,"9 and 
if so, how the two statutes were to be reconciled. The court found 
that the Code's position was inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Act 
since the use of an after-acquired clause to secure property in which 
the debtor first obtained rights during the relevant four-month 
period is a transfer to the creditor at the time such rights were ob-
tained, for value given on the execution of the original agreement 
(an antecedent debt) and therefore proscribed by section 60.10 To 
5. Section 60 mentions eight requirements, all of which must be fulfilled for a 
transaction to be adjudged a voidable preference: (1) the transferred property must 
be the debtor's; (2) the transfer must be to a creditor; (3) the transfer must be volun-
tary; (4) it must be for the benefit of the creditor; (5) it must be within four months 
of bankruptcy; (6) it must be for or on account of an antecedent debt; (7) the transfer 
must result in that particular creditor acquiring a greater percentage of the debtor's 
assets than do other creditors; and (8) the creditor must have known or had reason 
to know that the debtor was insolvent. Requirements 1 through 4, 7, and 8 were 
found to have been satisfied in the principal case and will not be discussed further 
in this note. 
6, ORE. REY. STAT. § 79.2040(3) (1965). 
7. ORE REY. STAT. § 79.1100 (1965). Thus the necessity of describing each single 
piece of inventory or individual account is eliminated. 
8. ORE. REY. STAT. § 79.2050 (1965). This provision is especially important, since 
it rejects the "dominion" doctrine of .Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925), where 
the United States Supreme Court held that retention of too much "dominion" by 
the debtor over the collateral would void the entire security interest. For sources 
pointing out some of the problems created by Benedict, see Cohen & Gerber, 
Mortgages of Accounts Receivable, 29 GEO. LJ. 555 (1941); Comment, 39 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 1338 (1939). 
9. Section 60, as pointed out by the court, is only one in a series of provisions 
aimed at protecting unsecured creditors. See principal case at 71137. 
10. It should be noted that the court is not alone in its conclusion; many dis-
tinguished writers have found the same conflict to exist. See, e.g., Gordon, The Secur-
ity Interest in Inventory Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the 
Preference Problem, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 49 (1962); Kennedy, The Tnsstee in Bank-
ruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Problems Suggested by Articles 2 
and 9, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 518 (1960); Riemer, The After-Acquired Property Clause 
Revisited, 70 Co:r.r. L.J. 3!14 (1965). 
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reach this conclusion, the court necessarily had to decide two separate 
issues (although it did not articulate them as such): (I) was there 
a "transfer" within the meaning of section 60 during the four month 
period; and (2) if there was a transfer, was it "for or on account of 
an antecedent debt"? 
In answering the first question, the court found that the language 
of the Code itself required a finding that a "transfer" within the 
meaning of section 60 had been made during the relevant period. 
Section 60(a)(2) provides that a transfer will be deemed to have 
been made when a security interest becomes sufficiently "perfected" 
under state law (represented by the Code in this, and most, cases) 
that it would be given priority over a subsequent lien obtained by 
legal or equitable proceedings.11 The court noted that section 9-303(1) 
of the Code requires that a security interest "attach" before it 
can be "perfected,"12 and that, under section 9-204, such an interest 
cannot "attach" until the debtor "has rights in the collateral."13 
Since section 9-204(2)(d) states that the debtor can have no rights 
in accounts until they come into existence,14 the court concluded 
that attachment, and therefore perfection, of the security interest 
in each individual account occurred when that account accrued. 
Consequently, those accounts which accrued within the four month 
period were "transferred" within the meaning of section 60(a)(2) 
during the relevant time period. 
Accepting the court's atomistic definition of the term "collateral" 
in section 9-204, this logic is irrefutable. However, the creditor ar-
gued that, in the context of security agreements, specific accounts 
or items of inventory should not be considered indiyidually when 
"accounts" or "inventory" were designated generally as collateral. 
Rather, such terms should be viewed in a generic sense, referring 
to a quantity which remains sufficiently identifiable, although its 
particular parts might change. If this "mass" theory were accepted, 
the debtor, for the purposes of the security agreement, would be 
11. 64 Stat. 24 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96a(2) (1964). Viewing article 9 in light of this 
rule, one might initially conclude that the Code placed all security arrangements in 
jeopardy by giving holders of purchase money security interests, ORE. REv. STAT, 
§ 79.1070 (1965) (U.C.C. § 9-107), priority over previous lien creditors. ORE. REv. STAT. 
§ 79.3120(3)(4) (1965) (U.C.C. § 9-312). This has never been seriously argued, however, 
undoubtedly because a purchase money security interest is most correctly viewed as 
a prior claim on the property, accruing before the debtor acquires his rights. See 
Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to After-Acquired Property Clauses 
Under the Code, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 194, 217 n.107, 218 (1959). 
12. This section, ORE. REv. STAT. § 79.303(1) (1965), outlines the steps necessary to 
"perfect" an interest and thus the way to insure that it will be given "priority" over 
unsecured claims. 
13. "A security interest cannot attach until there is agreement that it attach and 
value is given and the debtor has rights in the collateral." ORE. REv. STAT. § 79.204(1) 
(1965). 
14. ORE. REv. STAT.§ 79.204(2)(d) (1965). 
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deemed to have rights in later acquired collateral at the time the 
agreement is executed, the creditor's interest would attach to the 
collateral upon execution of the agreement, and the creditor's secur-
ity interest in the collateral would be perfected upon the filing of 
a financing statement. Thus, where, as in the principal case, the 
statement is filed prior to four months preceding bankruptcy, the 
transfer could not be deemed a voidable preference under section 
60. Such an approach is based upon two theories proffered by writers 
in order to defend article 9 .floating liens from an attack by section 
60(a)(2): the "unitary" theory1 is and the "automatic perfection" 
theory.16 The two theories involve different analyses17 but are equally 
dependent upon acceptance of the "mass" interpretation of collateral 
in section 9-204, since both view rights in future property as being 
perfected at the time of the original security agreement. However, 
as the court in the principal case correctly noted, such a view is 
hopelessly inconsistent with section 9-204(2)(d), which states that a 
party can have no rights in "an account until it comes into exis-
tence" (emphasis added). Moreover, the comment on that section18 
clearly reveals that the Code's drafters intended that accounts,19 as 
collateral, are to be viewed separately and not as a "mass.''20 
15. The generally recognized source of this theory is Judge MacGruder's opinion 
in Manchester Nat'l Bank v. Roche, 186 F.2d 827 (1st Cir. 1951), where, in dictum, 
he stated: "By analogy it might be possible to treat a merchant's accounts receivable 
as a unit presently and continuously in existence, the component elements of which 
(the particular accounts] may be constantly changing without affecting the identity 
of the res." Id. at 8!11. The leading article in support of this theory is Henson, "Pro-
ceeds" Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 CoLuM. L. REv. 232 (1965). See also 
Henson, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act Reconciled, 11 
.Bus. LAW. 371 (1966). 
16. See Friedman, supra note 11. 
17. The "unitary" view would simply call "accounts" the collateral and thus have 
all rights to the mass pass at the execution of the original agreement. The theory 
can best be illustrated by an analogy used by its proponents: the current asset is a 
river, whose parts are ever changing; yet the whole is, for all practical purposes, 
constant. Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 COLUM, L. REv. 
232, 233-34 (1965). 
The "automatic perfection" theory, on the other hand, does not view the original 
agreement as passing a present interest in all collateral, but rather regards the after-
acquired clause as passing present rights in a future interest. Thus when the debtor 
later acquires an interest in each single piece, it will be deemed to have been auto-
matically perfected at the time of original perfection. 
18. U.C.C. § 9-204, comment 4, notes: "(A] security agreement may be executed 
and value given before the debtor acquires rights; the security interest will then 
attach when he does." (Emphasis added.) 
19. It is interesting to note that although this explicit exception exists for ac-
counts, there is no comparable provision applicable to inventory. Therefore § 9-204(1) 
would apply, and that section is in no way irreconcilable with the "mass" idea. Thus, 
although theoretically the "mass" concept would be equally applicable either to· 
accounts or to inventory, the language of § 9-204 may produce a difference in results 
in cases involving these two types of assets. 
20. This discussion has not mentioned the most viable theory presented by the 
creditor-the "substituted collateral" theory. See GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PER-
SONAL PROl'.EltTY § 45.6, at 1315-16 (1965); Coogan &: .Bok, The Impact of the Uniform 
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Assuming that the court was correct in concluding that a trans-
fer took place within the four months preceding bankruptcy, it 
nevertheless had to consider the second question of whether the 
transfer was made for or on account of an antecedent debt, since this 
too is' a sine qua non of a voidable preference. It would appear that 
the court was unwarranted in concluding that this requirement was 
satisfied in the principal case. Section 9-108 of the Code explicitly 
states that any interest in after-acquired property will be deemed 
to have been taken for new value if the interest was received in the 
ordinary course of business or under a contract of purchase.21 Since 
section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act makes no attempt to define the 
phrase "for or on account of an antecedent debt," section 9-108 of 
the Code will in effect remove floating liens from the scope of the 
voidable preference provisions unless the judicial interpretation or 
legislative history of those provisions, or policy reasons, dictate to 
the contrary. 
The court in the principal case found that the meaning of "ante-
cedent debt" in section 60, as that section was interpreted in Corn 
Exchange Bank v. Klauder,22 was inconsistent with the provisions 
of section 9-108 of the Code. In Klauder, the United States Supreme 
Court held that an assignment of existing accounts was a voidable 
preference even though the assignment was made for concurrent 
value before the four months preceding bankruptcy. However, since 
Klauder may be distinguished from the principal case, it is not 
Commercial Code on the Corporate Indenture, 69 YALE L.J. 203, 249 (1959). This 
theory views the security arrangement in a very practical, businesslike manner-as 
an arrangement intended to initiate a continual flow of the original credit through 
the business of the debtor. The theory recognizes that, as the original collateral (the 
accounts) are turned into cash, into inventory, and then back into accounts, new 
receivables are constantly being substituted for the old. This theory could arguably 
be used to circumvent the attachment problems of § 9-204, since no property received 
during the four month period is viewed as having been passed under the original 
agreement. Rather, there is a recognition that new collateral has been substituted 
for old-a course of action always available under § 60 because the debtor's estate 
has not been diminished. In re Pusey-Mayers-Breisch Co., 37 F. Supp. 316 (E.D. Pa.), 
afj'd, 122 F.2d 606 (3d Cir. 1941). But the substituted collateral theory actually seems 
to go more to whether the transfer-admittedly made during the four-month period 
-was "for or on account of an antecedent debt"; and this is one reason why the idea 
was not discussed in the text. 
The court did not pass on the merits of the substituted collateral theory, but 
rather held it inapplicable to the facts of the case. The referee found that all of 
Rose City's loans were given and used for the emergency purposes of meeting operat-
ing expenses rather than for providing new working capital. While this could be 
attacked as an extremely short-sighted view of the function of emergency operating 
loans, it does furnish a credible reason for ignoring the merits of the theory in this 
case. In general, however, the "substituted collateral" theory appears to be by far 
the best of the "explaining" theories, and any court which overlooked the theory's 
basic insight into what a secured transaction actually means to the parties involved 
would seem to be unnecessarily restricting its own perspective of the problem. 
21. ORE. REv. STAT. § 79.1080 (1965). 
22. 318 U.S. 434: (194:3). 
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dispositive of the issue. The accounts in Klauder were assigned for 
new value, but, unlike the creditor in the principal case, the creditor 
in Klauder did not, at the time of assignment, give any notice of 
the security agreement to the persons whose accounts were secured. 
Consequently, at the time of the original agreement, the creditor's 
interest had not been sufficiently perfected under state law so as to 
render the transaction a "transfer."23 Subsequently, upon bank-
ruptcy of the debtor, the creditor finally gave notice of his interest 
to the bankrupt's obligors and therefore the "transfer" was deemed 
to have been made at that time-the time of perfection-for con-
sideration passed at the time of the original agreement-an ante-
cedent debt. Nothing in Klauder indicates that the original trans-
action, even if it had been made within the four month period, 
would have been voidable had the creditor perfected his interest 
by meeting the notice requirements of state law. Furthermore, there 
is nothing in Klauder which implies that a state would not be free 
to determine when new value would be deemed to have passed. 
Since Klauder is the only significant case in the area, and since it 
did not address itself to the particular issue of concem,24 one must 
look to the legislative history of section 60 for a more definitive 
answer to the question whether the transfer in the principal case 
was in fact a voidable preference. 
The legislative history of section 60, which was totally ignored 
by the court in the principal case, indicates that the type of trans-
action involved in the instant case is not the kind that the Bank-
ruptcy Act intended to proscribe. The original act25 did not pro-
vide any test for determining when a transfer would be deemed 
to have been made for an antecedent debt, and, as was subsequently 
23. Under the law existing at that time, a "transfer" was made when a lien was 
so far perfected that no subsequent bona .fide purchaser could obtain superior rights 
in the collateral. For a more detailed look at this provision and the problems which 
it caused, see notes 27-34 infra and accompanying text. 
24-. Other cases were discussed which did involve after-acquired property clauses, 
but as the court pointed out, in none was the § 60-article 9 conflict in issue. See 
Mason v. Citizens' Nat'! Trust &: Sav • .Bank, 71 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1934-); In re Newkirk 
Mining Co., 54- .BERKS Co. L.J. 179 (D. Pa. 1962) (referee's opinion); Joe Heuston 
Tractor&: Implement Co. v. Clarsson, 59 N.M. 486, 287 P .2d 57 (1955). 
It should be added that an even less valid reason for rejecting § 9-108 was later 
advanced by the court when it said that the section existed for the sole purpose of 
avoiding § 60. This argument is unconvincing for two reasons. First, when many of 
the most learned men in a .field devote their time and expertise to writing a uniform 
state law, it would seem appropriate to assume that they were trying to work within 
existing federal law. Second, and more important, there is a very real purpose for 
§ 9-108 other than evading voidable preference laws. As is pointed out by Professor 
Grant Gilmore, chief draftsman of article 9, § 9-108 limits the kinds of property 
which, when transferred under an after-acquired property clause, will be deemed 
to have been taken for new value-only property received in the ordinary course of 
busineM or under a contract of purchase will be so considered. GILMORE, op. cit. 
supra note 20, at 1314-15. 
25. 30 Stat. 54-4- (1898). 
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noted in the committee reports of the House of Representatives,26 
this would have remained the case had it not been for several Su-
preme Court decisions around the turn of the century which upheld 
the use of the "secret" or "pocket" lien.27 These decisions permitted 
creditors who had negotiated security interests on specific collateral 
without giving notice to future creditors by filing or by taking 
possession of the collateral to slink in on the eve of bankruptcy 
(which was sometimes years later)28 and perfect their interest by the 
appropriate means. In 1938, after several unsuccessful attempts to 
remedy this situation,29 Congress passed the Chandler Amendment,30 
which, as one writer stated, proved to be "the classic example of 
the overkill."31 However, despite its seemingly harsh approach to-
ward secured financing, the legislative history of the Chandler 
Amendment, including the section quoted by the Supreme Court in 
Klauder, 32 indicates that it was intended to eliminate only the types 
of fraudulent and quasi-fraudulent dealing found in the "secret" 
and "pocket" lien situations; it was never intended to proscribe 
legitimate business transactions where, as in the present case, the 
filing of a :financing statement is a necessary element of perfection 
and serves as a warning to all future creditors.33 Furthermore, in 
1950, Congress retreated from the bona fide purchaser test34 and 
adopted the present "lien-creditor test," but again the legislative 
history does not reveal an intent to disrupt normal secured business 
transactions when notice is given at the time the secured transaction 
26. H.R. REP. No. 1293, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1949). 
27. Carey v. Donahue, 240 U.S. 430 (1916); Sexton v. Kessler &: Co., 225 U.S. 90 
(1912); Humphrey v. Tatman, 198 U.S. 91 (1905); Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U.S. 516 
(1905). 
28. E.g., in Thompson v. Fairbanks, supra note 27, the security interest was taken 
in 1894 and not perfected until just prior to bankruptcy in 1903. 
29. Amendment attempts which failed to terminate the secret liens were 32 Stat. 
799 (1903), 36 Stat. 842 (1910), and 44 Stat. 666 (1926). For a history of these provisions, 
see 3 COLLIER, .BANKRUPTCY § 60.37 (14th rev. ed. 1964). 
30. 52 Stat. 869 (1938). 
31. GILMORE, op. cit. supra note 20, at 1302. The amendment, under which Klauder 
was decided, stated that any transfer made during the four-month period was voidable 
unless the security interest had been so far perfected (i.e., by filing or possession) that 
the creditor would have rights in the collateral superior to those of a bona fide pur-
chaser. The obvious problem created by this amendment was that no debtor wanted 
to mortgage his property to a degree that made it impossible for him to pass good 
title in the collateral, yet such an interest was necessary to a secured creditor if his 
interest was to stand up in the event of bankruptcy. 
32. 318 U.S. at 439. 
33. Professor James A. MacLachlan, author of the amendment, stated in com-
mittee hearings: "[W]e are not saying that you cannot make a mortgage on after-
acquired property. What we do say is that a lien is not regarded as made for the 
purpose of the law of preference • • • until it is so far perfected as to be good against 
a bona fide purchaser." Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary To Study 
Revision of the Bankruptcy Act, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 9, at 123 (1937). 
34. Note 31 supra and accompanying text. 
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is initiated. The House Committee on the Judiciary noted that 
"the present language of the act [the Chandler Amendment] tends 
to impede and choke the flow of credit, principally to small-busi-
nessmen, and the object of the bill is to free its channels."35 The 
report proceeds to cast doubt upon the wisdom of the Klauder de-
cision36 and finally states that the objectives of the new amendment 
were: (1) to continue the Chandler Amendment's attack on secret 
and pocket liens; and (2) to "provide that no transfer made in good 
faith, for a new present consideration, shall constitute a prefer-
ence ... if the provisions of applicable State law governing the per-
fection of such transfer are complied with."31 Nowhere does the 
Committee attempt to define "new present consideration," nor is 
there any indication that a state is not free to define the phrase as 
long as the dangers of secret liens are avoided.38 
Thus, neither the judicial interpretation nor the legislative his-
tory of the Bankruptcy Act provides a viable justification for deny-
ing effect to section 9-108 of the Code. The enactment of that sec-
tion by the legislatures of the forty-seven39 states which have adopted 
the Code would seemingly represent a legitimate exercise of the 
power left to the states to define an antecedent debt and therefore 
it should be applied despite objections grounded upon "policy" 
considerations. Such legislatures have presumably satisfied them-
selves as to the merits of floating liens, and for a court to question 
a legislature's judgment would, in this instance, be improper. How-
ever, since the court in the principal case did attack the merits 
of the floating lien, and since this disenchantment apparently was 
a prime factor in its decision, the court's argument should be 
examined. 
The court felt that the lack of adequate policing safeguards in 
after-acquired property agreements removed the "financial finger" 
of the creditor from the "pulse" of the debtor.40 It also condemned 
35. H.R. REP. No. 1293, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1949). 
36. Id. at 5. 
37. Id. at 6. 
38. Professor MacLachlan, see note 33 supra, now in residence at the University 
of Michigan Law School, agrees that § 60 was not intended to apply to transactions 
like those authorized by article 9. Interview with Professor MacLachlan, in Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, Jan. 13, 1967. Professor MacLachlan cited the following as advice 
to those who felt that § 60 was intended to apply: 
The law may be resembled to a nut, which has a shell and a kernel and 
as you will be no better for the nut if you make use only of the shell, s~ you 
will receive no benefit of the law, if you rely only upon the letter, and as the 
fruit and profit of the nut lies in the shell [sic], so the fruit of the law consists 
in the sense more than the letter. 
2 Plowden 450, 465-67, 75 Eng. Rep. 688, 695 (1574), quoted in Schwartz v. Mills, 192 
F.2d 727, 733 (2d Cir. 1951). 
39. As of December 31, 1966, only Arizona, Idaho, and Louisiana had not adopted 
the U.C.C. Adoption is expected in the first two states during 1967. 
40. This language brings back shadows of the Benedict v. Ratner "dominion" 
doctrine which was specifically rejected by the Code. See note 8 supra. 
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such agreements since they could be used by one creditor to monopo-
lize whole areas of the debtor's current assets. Finally, it expressed 
regret that the "old-fashioned method of operating a business on 
the strength of equity capital" was giving way to these newer plans, 
which, the court felt, left daily suppliers and employees in precarious 
positions.41 
In several respects, the court's reasoning overlooks the realities 
of present-day business operations. There is absolutely nothing in 
the Code to prevent a creditor from policing his debtor as much as 
he wishes-in fact, such policing is encouraged. The form used by 
the parties in the principal case called for financial reporting by the 
debtor forty-five days after each fiscal quarter and was modified 
by the parties so as to provide for reporting within thirty days after 
the end of each month.42 The court's "monopolization" argument 
is equally unconvincing. The debtor is obviously quite free to 
mortgage as few or as many of his assets to as few or as many 
persons as he desires. Reporter, for example, had mortgaged several 
selected accounts before entering into the agreements with Rose 
City. The weakness of the "monopolization" argument is further 
demonstrated by two additional considerations: (1) the debtor can 
always pay off his debt and refinance with a new creditor; and 
(2) from a planning standpoint, borrowers are frequently better off 
when they deal with a single lender. Finally, the court's "equity 
capital" argument is completely unrealistic. Even ignoring the fact 
that debt financing is often considered economically sounder than 
equity financing,43 it seems obvious that, in an age of big business, 
the emerging small competitor, especially one whose largest capital 
investment is in inventory or who is forced by competition to sell 
on open account, must be free to secure loans with these principal 
assets if he is to have a sufficient economic base for growth. And if 
the debtor is a floundering, rather than an emerging enterprise, 
his daily suppliers and employees should be only too happy that 
these assets are available for use in a revitalization program. 
Most important, the opposition to floating liens which is evi-
denced by the court in the principal case completely ignores the 
fact that current asset financing has always been possible44-the 
41. For a more complete view of the court's ideas, see principal case 1111 71136-38. 
42. The form employed was No. 1208 U.C.C. Series, entitled "Accounts Receivable 
Loan and Security Agreement." Principal case 11 71135. For an article on the fre. 
quency of such policing measures despite a lack of legal compulsion, see Greenberg, 
Inventory and Accounts Receivable Finandng, 1956 ILL. L.F, 601. 
It should be noted that many of the problems involved here could have been 
alleviated had the parties not removed the "proceeds" clause from the form. Under 
such a clause, the creditor automatically would have had rights in all identifiable 
proceeds from the accounts. ORE. REv. STAT. § 79.3060 (1965) (U.C.C. § 9-306). 
43. See, e.g., Where To Look for Money, 16 Bus. LAw. 257 (1960). 
44. Cohen &: Gerber, The After-Acquired Property Clause, 87 U, PA. L. REv. 635 
(1939). See also In re New Haven Clock &: Watch Co., 253 F.2d 377 (2d Cir, 1958); 16 
LAW&: CoNTEMP. PlloB. 27 (1951). 
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Code merely facilitates the process, and it does so without harming 
anyone. Certainly the parties can have no objection to the stream-
lined procedures established by the Code, for those procedures can 
only make life easier for them. Moreover, the Code's notice-filing 
requirements insure that no future creditors will be misled; they 
can always ascertain the exact state of the debtor's secured credit 
by checking the appropriate place of filing.45 Finally, subsequent 
creditors would be no better off if a renegotiation were required 
for each transaction, since section 9-403(2) states that any filing 
statement remains effective for five years46 and consequently the 
first statement filed by the secured creditor would cover any asset 
of the same type mortgaged within that five year period. Thus, it 
would seem that floating liens are desirable instruments of commer-
cial financing and that therefore the decision in the principal case 
is incorrect even as a matter of policy.47 
45. Section 9-401 of the Code has three alternative subsections relating to the 
place of filing. Oregon had adopted a modified form of the third alternative. See 
ORE. REv. STAT. § 79.401(1) (1965). 
46. ORE. REv. STAT. § 79.403(2) (1965). 
47. It must be added that, although the decision in the principal case should be 
reversed, those who would support the decision certainly have presented well-reasoned 
and acceptable arguments. See note IO supra. Unless a definitive court decision ap-
pears, there is likely to be a substantial split of authority on the issue, which 
will result in confusion among creditors as to what they may or may not do. Thus, 
if such a decision does not come forth in the near future, one or both of the statutes 
should be amended to clarify the law. At least two proposals have been made to 
amend § 9-108 so as to state specifically that the transfer of after-acquired property 
is accomplished at the time of the original agreement. [An amendment proposed by 
Friedman, supra note 11, at 224, would simply change "shall be deemed to be taken 
for new value and not as security for an antecedent debt" to "shall be deemed to be 
a present transfer of a present expectance interest in the future property." A similar 
proposal to amend § 9-108 in Michigan, which was not enacted by the legis-
lature, would have eliminated part of the problem by also deleting § 9-204(2)(d). See 
notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text.] But amending the Code would not seem 
to be the answer. Those who believe that the Code and the .Bankruptcy Act are 
irreconcilable do not feel that the conflict is caused by § 9-108, the provisions of 
which are relatively clear, but rather by § 60. Thus the lasting solution would be 
to amend the Bankruptcy Act. 
Help is definitely on the way. The National Bankruptcy Conference has appointed 
a blue-ribbon committee, including Messrs. Gilmore, Coogan, and Kennedy (see re-
spectively, notes 20, 20, &: IO supra) to investigate the problem and to recommend ap-
propriate amendments either to the Bankruptcy Act or to both it and the Code. 
Several proposals have been made, but no definitive action has yet been taken. 
